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Militarizing Innovation: The Path to Global Stability¶
In a recent dialogue with The Economist, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, General Valery Zaluzhny, gave a stark assessment of their ongoing conflict with Russia – they lack the technological advantage to make strides and are at a stalemate with Russia. His reflections resonate with a long-standing consensus among military strategists and geopolitical analysts regarding the critical importance of technological advancement in warfare. The Russo-Ukrainian war, despite the employment of modern military technologies, demonstrates a broader imperative for the West: to win wars and mitigate risks, a nation must relentlessly pursue and attain technological dominance over its adversaries.
Historical military engagements, from using longbows at Agincourt to deploying tanks in North Africa during World War II, testify to technological superiority’s game-changing impact. The tide of battle is often swayed by the side wielding the superior technology, dictating terms of engagement and, ultimately, the conflict’s outcome.
Fast forward to the 21st century, and the narrative remains unchanged, albeit leveraging more sophisticated technologies. The United States, acutely cognizant of the evolving global military landscape, heavily invests in its defense innovation ecosystem—here I’ll credit the National Defense Industrial Association – (NDIA) , of which I am a member, and the military’s own innovation initiatives such as the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) , the Air Force’s AFWERX , and the Army Futures Command , to name a few entities engaging in the pursuit of future military superiority. This progressive strategy, striving to stay ahead of a broader global imperative for technological ascendancy, is instrumental in maintaining the U.S.’s cutting-edge military posture, especially against rising global competitors like China ( Gholz & Sapolsky, 2021 ).
Ukraine’s General Zaluzhny’s reflections in The Economist are an ages-old conundrum, where the technological impasse on the battlefield necessitates a monumental leap in warfare technology to alter the dynamics of the conflict ( The Economist, 2023 ). A nation’s relentless quest for technological dominance transcends tactical advantage, aiming to redefine modern warfare’s landscape to foster a more secure and less aggressive global milieu. As we progress in military technologies, we, ideally, regress in the number of wars engaged.
Matthew Kroenig , in his book ‘The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy,’ explains the merits of the U.S. leveraging “Superiority-Brinkmanship Synthesis Theory” within the nuclear domain. The theory posits that nuclear superiority can significantly influence crisis bargaining, enhancing our state’s deterrent posture by putting us at the head of the table. Describing the Superiority-Brinkmanship Synthesis Theory in my own words, as succinctly and accurately as possible, I’d summarize it as the U.S. having nuclear capabilities so superior that not only would no nation want to attack us with nukes because our second strike (that is: defensive return volley) would annihilate them, but our overall missile defense system built for this task would likely prevent us from experiencing any of their first-wave missile offensive whatsoever. The enemy would still endure our return volley, while we would live to see another day—thus, attempting to nuke the U.S. is akin to a nation nuking itself. Nobody wants to nuke themselves, so we hold all the cards at the bargaining table when the threat of war escalates to this level because no sane nation has risk tolerance so high that they wish to cease to exist as a result of a disagreement with the United States. As it turns out, the threat of our overwhelming nuclear retaliation creates peace.
Superiority brinkmanship extends beyond the nuclear realm, suggesting a nearly all-encompassing strategy for most facets of warfare. A state can deter adversaries by amassing overwhelming military superiority and, ideally, avoiding war altogether. This strategy aligns with the ancient wisdom of Sun Tzu in The Art of War, stating that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” and “victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.” We want to seek to win a war before we even enter one, which requires technologies far superior to our adversaries. Just as our nuclear superiority prevents nuclear war, so too does the concept extend to other methods of warfare outside of nukes.
The Just War Theory, traditionally employed to evaluate war’s moral and ethical justifiability, can be juxtaposed with this strategic discourse. A more just stance than engaging in a just war would be to leverage superior war technologies and employ superiority brinkmanship to deter our adversaries and avoid wars entirely. This approach resonates with one of my favorite military quotes, written by a Roman writer named Vegetius in the 4th century AD in his book Epitoma rei militaris (also referred to as De re militari); the famous quote goes, “Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum,” or, in English, “If you want peace, prepare for war.” You might have heard an old military nerd like myself repeating this line a time or two. It’s a simple concept: the best way to avoid war is to be prepared for one. After all, who wants to take on a fully ready and willing opponent with the odds stacked high against them? I wouldn’t challenge Mike Tyson to a boxing match, and no nation should try to engage in proverbial fisticuffs with the military might of the United States of America.
Of course, superiority brinkmanship is merely a theory, and as we all know well, theories don’t always play out perfectly in reality. First, those employing it must be moral, or they risk leveraging this superiority to their advantage to overwhelm all enemies and force the world to comply… let us hope this is not true of the United States and that our allies in NATO and our non-NATO allies are motivated to sign on as our pal’s because they trust us and not because they fear us. I digress… Human nature and unexpected actions of our adversaries often lead to extenuating circumstances where war is unavoidable because a nation’s or people’s leaders do not always make moral decisions. As seen in Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression and Israel’s defense against Hamas’s terrorist attacks—the reality of humanity is often disappointing. Just wars may present themselves, necessitating defensive actions. In such cases, the military must end the war swiftly with minimal damage to its citizens, military, and budget while sparing innocent bystanders wherever possible. Technologically superior weapons of war enable these means when brinkmanship cannot avoid the war entirely.
Brinkmanship plays out differently in all cases – for instance, Russia may not like us arming and funding Ukraine, but they’re not exactly eager to begin a war on a new front with the United States because our posture is too threatening for their risk profile. Thus, we get away with a strategy of aiding our allies. With terrorism, unfortunately, as in Israel’s case and the U.S.’s case in our wars in the Middle East, the rules are different; how can you threaten an invisible enemy who hides among innocent civilians to discourage your defensive maneuvers? Our own use cases show it’s nearly impossible for us and our moralistic rules of warfare, and I won’t suggest we should have changed those. In Israel’s case, however, they’re experiencing terrible atrocities in their homeland, which necessitates a winning defensive posture. I said more about that in this LinkedIn Post and will leave it at that—I won’t posit any further theories for terrorist scenarios in this article. I will instead remain focused on traditional state-to-state warfare. Suffice it to say, however, that brinkmanship alone is not a one-size-fits-all strategy for avoiding or winning all conflicts at all times.
For America and the rest of the West to avoid stalemate wars with foreign states such as Russia, however, it must continue leveraging superiority brinkmanship to posture its technological capabilities. Our goal is that our adversaries do not want to engage in war with us for fear of overwhelming retaliation. I posit that this strategy is already employed and achieving those ends for the United States in the case of Russia, who, again, is not retaliating despite our support of Ukraine. These truths underscore the need for continued judicious investment in developing and possessing overwhelming military superiority to deter our adversaries from provoking conflict further, even as they continue to research and develop new technologies to gain their own advantages. We must never stop continually pursuing technological military advantage to ensure these tables never turn against us. My fellow Americans, our government may not be perfect, but do you ever want to be conquered by another one? I think not. Let us remain dominant.
This discourse on technological dominance in the military transcends theoretical debate; it’s a clarion call for policymakers, military strategists, and global leaders in the US and the West to double down on investments in military technological dominance. As the ongoing Ukraine conflict demonstrates, technological superiority in modern warfare is a non-negotiable asset for ensuring national and global security in an increasingly tumultuous world.
Si vis pacem, para bellum.
Written by 🇺🇸 Bruce B. A. West
PS: This goes without saying, but the thoughts I share on LinkedIn through my profile, posts, and comments are my own original thoughts and do not reflect the opinions or official stances of my employer, Booz Allen Hamilton , nor that of my clients in the United States Department of Defense .
References:
Chin, W. (2019). Technology, war and the state: past, present and future. International Affairs, 95(4), 765-783. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz106
Gholz, E., & Sapolsky, H. M. (2021). The defense innovation machine: Why the U.S. will remain on the cutting edge. Defence Studies, 21(3), 854-872. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2021.1917392
Hammes, T. X. (2021, Oct 14). The Tactical Defense Becomes Dominant Again. Joint Force Quarterly 103. National Defense University Press. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/
Kroenig, M. (2018). The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters. Oxford University Press.
Sun Tzu. (1963). The Art of War (S. B. Griffith, Trans.). Oxford University Press.
The Economist. (2023, Nov 1). Ukraine’s commander-in-chief on the breakthrough he needs to beat Russia. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/01/ukraines-commander-in-chief-on-the-breakthrough-he-needs-to-beat-russia
Vegetius Renatus, F. (1944). De Re Militari (The Military Institutions of the Romans) (J. Clarke, Trans.). Military Service Publishing Co.